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Abstract. Preˆt a` Voter is one of the most well-known and most extensively analysed electronic voting
systems for polling stations. However, an analysis from a legal point of view has not yet been conducted.
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the readiness of Preˆt a` Voter for legally binding federal elections
in Germany. This case is of particular interest as Germany has with the Constitutional Court Decision
from 2009 probably the most restrictive requirements on electronic voting in particular regarding the
public nature of elections and verifiability respectively. While many aspects are analysed, some remain
open for further legal and technical discussions. Thus, a final decision is not yet possible. Aspects
analysed are the ballot paper layout, different processes from ballot printing through to the publishing
of results, as well as verifiability, and the overall election management.
1 Introduction
Since the 1960s several attempts have been made in Germany to replace manual casting and counting of votes
by mechanical and later electronic voting systems. These efforts have always been based on the ambition
to obtain a correct election result within a very short period of time. Electronic voting machines were first
deployed in Germany on the occasion of the European elections in 1999. These machines produced by the
company of Nedap were used on all election levels. After their usage for the elections of the German Bundestag
(Federal Diet) in 2005 two people filed a complaint against this election. These complaints went through
several instances and ended up at the Federal Constitutional Court. In 2009, the Federal Constitutional
Court declared the used electronic voting machines and the Federal Voting Machine Ordinance which defines
the requirements a voting machine has to ensure, to be unconstitutional because both did not meet the
requirements emerging from Article 38 in conjunction with Article 20.1 and 20.2 of the German Constitution.
From these articles the court deduced that it must be possible to check the essential steps in the election
process including the accurate counting of votes [5, page 71]. Now, election authorities are looking for an
electronic voting machine that meets these requirements and can therefore be classified as constitutionally
compatible.
Preˆt a` Voter is one of the best known electronic voting systems which implements verifiability, has a
prototype actually implemented, and has been successfully used in (test) elections in the U.K. Over time
different variations of Preˆt a` Voter have been published and their security has been analysed. However, an
analysis from a legal point of view has not yet been conducted.
This paper analyses which version of Preˆt a` Voter fits best to the regulations of the Federal Electoral
Act, the Federal Electoral Code, and the German Constitution. It also discusses necessary modifications
to the system and the processes. In general, we tried to keep the process for voters as similar as possible
to what they know and as simple as possible. Such an analysis was possible due to the cooperation and
interdisciplinary work between computer scientists and legal researchers. We categorise our discussion into
the following groups: aspects that are relevant for the ballot paper design, the different processes, verifiability,
and election management. Voting registration and authentication in the polling station are not taken into
account for this paper as these processes do not need to be modified.
The paper is structured in the following way: we first provide an introduction to the German federal
elections in Section 2 and then to Preˆt a` Voter in Section 3. Afterwards, we discuss legal and technical
aspects of the ballot paper design in Sections 4 and 5, different processes starting from ballot printing
until the publishing of receipts in Section 6, the type of verifiability in Section 7 and the overall election
management in Section 8. The paper concludes with a brief summary and remarks for future work (Section
9).
2 German Federal Election
According to Article 38.1 German Constitution/Grundgesetz (GG) the Bundestag is elected in universal,
direct, free, equal and secret suffrage. Subject to particular regulations, the elections take place every four
years. Voters can cast two votes on one ballot paper (see Fig. 1). With the first vote they select a named
candidate from their home county (electoral district). With the second vote they select the list of a party on
state level. Half of the delegates move into parliament because of the first vote, half because of the second
vote. After §1.1 of the Federal Electoral Act (FEA), the Bundestag generally consists of 598 delegates.
Fig. 1. Ballot paper for the German Federal Election in 2009
According to [6], roughly 62.2 million Germans were eligible to vote in the elections for the Bundestag
in 2009. 70.8 percent cast their votes while 1.7 percent of the first votes and 1.4 percent of the second votes
were invalid. Based on the handover of empty or crossed ballot papers, it is assumed that nearly 70 percent
of them have been spoiled on purpose. For the elections of the Bundestag the territory of the 16 federal
states is subdivided into 299 electoral districts. Due to the fact that every electoral district nominates local
candidates for the first vote, the ballot papers differ from one district to another. The electoral districts are
subdivided into constituencies. After §12.1 of the Federal Electoral Code (FEC) municipalities with no more
than 2,500 inhabitants (generally 1,700 voters) usually form one constituency. Altogether there were 75,081
constituencies in Germany in 2009.
According to §31 FEA and §54 FEC everyone (not only eligible voters but everyone who is interested) is
allowed to be present at the polling station during the whole election procedure and during the vote counting
as long as they do not disturb any processes. Thus, people can observe the correct operation of the election
and the correct counting of votes. After §47.1 FEC the polling stations are open from 8am until 6pm on a
Sunday. The ascertainment of the results starts right after closing the polling stations. After deciding about
the validity of every vote, the returning committee5 ascertains the votes cast in the constituency according
to §§67–71 FEC. Referring to this, the head of the returning committee informs the local authority and
the district election officer who passes the respective district results to the state returning officer. The state
returning officer refers the results directly and continuously to the federal returning officer who publishes the
provisional curatorial election result. In the elections for the Bundestag in 2009, this result was published at
3.25am Monday morning.
5 The returning committee is the electoral body who takes care of the ordinary run of the election, watches the
observance of the electoral principles and counts the votes after closing the election.
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3 Preˆt a` Voter
Preˆt a` Voter is an end-to-end verifiable voting system. It provides secrecy of the ballot and integrity of
the election, and is designed also to allow verification of the processing of the votes, from casting through
to tallying. It achieves this by publishing auditable information for each stage the votes pass through, so
that verification rests on the information that is published rather than the processes which generated that
information. In fact there are several versions of Preˆt a` Voter, which vary in terms of the detail of how this
is achieved, and an overview of the differences and of the general Preˆt a` Voter approach is given in [11]. In
this paper we focus on elections where a vote is cast against a single candidate. Variants of Preˆt a` Voter are
also able to handle preferential voting, but we will not consider them here.
The key idea is that Preˆt a` Voter sets up the voting process so that voters cast their vote in a familiar
way, but the system accepts their vote in encrypted form. This allows publication of the list of encrypted
votes cast, and also allows the voters to retain a record of their cast vote to confirm that it appears on the
published list. The system then anonymises the votes, decrypts them, and finally tallies the results. The
anonymisation phase means that no decrypted vote can be linked with any encrypted vote cast by a specific
voter, preserving ballot secrecy. There are verification mechanisms for each of these phases—anonymisation,
decryption, tallying—which mean that the integrity of the election can be verified. A diagrammatic overview
of the process is given in Figure 2.
Fig. 2. Overview of the phases of Preˆt a` Voter vote processing
3.1 Vote casting
The central idea of Preˆt a` Voter is the use of a particular design of ballot form to capture the vote. In the
proposals to date, each ballot form contains the list of candidate names on the left hand side, in a random
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order which varies between ballot forms. The right hand side has a space against each candidate for the voter
to mark their vote, and also (at the bottom) the order of the candidates in encrypted and hashed form6. The
ballot form is perforated to allow the two sides to be separated. The voter marks their vote against their
chosen candidate, and then separates the two halves of the ballot paper and destroys the list of candidates
on the left hand side. The right hand side contains a vote marked in some position, and the hash value of
the ciphertext containing the order of candidates7. The right hand side is then scanned into the election
system, the scanner’s interpretation (in terms of the position of the mark) is displayed to the voter, the voter
confirms this is correct (or else corrects it either on the display or by filling out a new paper ballot), and
it is then accepted by the system for inclusion in the published list L1 of cast votes, which is published on
an online Web Bulletin Board (BB) together with the encryption of the corresponding candidate order. The
system will only accept a vote in which exactly one selection is made. The system provides the voter with a
signed record of the encrypted vote that has been accepted, which contains the cryptographic information on
the original right hand side, and the marked position. This can be compared with the one the voter scanned.
While the original one is put into a ballot box the printed and signed one is kept by the voter as receipt.
The voter can later check it against the published list of votes cast by looking it up on the BB. The record
does not reveal which candidate received the vote, since the random order of candidates means it could have
been any of them.
3.2 Vote processing
The list of accepted scanned votes L1 is a list of encrypted votes. They are now processed through a series
of stages to yield the final tally. The first stage is anonymisation: this is achieved by passing L1 through a
re-encryption mixnet [10], which shuﬄes the encrypted votes through a series of mixnet nodes which perform
secret permutations, while re-encrypting the votes. The result is a new list of different ciphertexts which
encrypt the same votes as the original list but in a different order. This resulting list L2 is also published.
No vote in L2 can be linked to any vote in the original list, and hence cannot be linked to any vote record
held by a voter. The shuﬄing and re-encryption can be verified, either by randomised partial checking [8],
or through proofs of re-encryption [13, 9], depending on the approach taken. Several mix servers are used,
each to perform a round of re-encryption and shuﬄing: secrecy of the shuﬄe is obtained provided they do
not all collude.
The second stage is decryption. The resulting list L2 of encrypted votes can now be decrypted. The
decryption key is shared across the election servers, so that a minimum number (threshold set) of them are
required to cooperate to decrypt the ballots. The resulting list L3 is also published. The decryption can be
audited against L2, and verified as valid by the public.
The final stage is tallying. The decrypted votes are tallied in order to obtain the result of the election.
Since the tallying algorithm is public, and the decrypted votes are published, the tallying process can be
checked and verified by any party.
4 General legal analysis of random candidate order
In this section we analyse whether shuﬄing candidates complies with the legal regulations for federal elections
in Germany. After §30.3 FEA the order of the party lists on state level depends on the number of the second
votes each party achieved in the particular federal state within the last election. The parties that are not
currently represented in parliament follow in alphabetical order. The order of the county proposals presented
on the left side of the ballot paper depends on the order of the respective party list. Other county proposals
follow in alphabetical order.
Correspondingly the random order of Preˆt a` Voter is not compatible with the current regulation of the
FEA. However, the question if it might be permissible in general, depends on constitutional requirements
6 The hash is used to keep it short. Instead of the hash value also a serial number could be used while this number
is bounded to the ciphertext of the candidate order e.g. via commitments of the Web Bulletin Board.
7 In the following we will use the term hash value when referring to this ciphertext.
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because the respective regulation can be changed if this is constitutionally compatible. The Federal Consti-
tutional Court abnegated the obligation to provide equal ballot papers in its decision from the 6th October
1970 [4, p. 164]. It pointed out that the regulation relevant to the case ensures the ordinary flow of the
election, but is not necessary from a constitutional point of view.
The principle of the equal suffrage according to Article 38.1 GG forms the basis for the organisation of
the election and the functionality of the voting system [14, §1, Rn. 42]. After the jurisdiction of the Federal
Constitutional Court it contains the equality of counter value8 for the first and second vote, the equality of
result value9 for the second vote and the equality of opportunity for all candidates [1, p. 246, 247 ].
The third aspect would be strengthened by the random order. In reference to this every candidate needs
to have the same chance to win the election. Although a strict order is not said to violate the principle of the
equal suffrage because voters prefer to make their decisions based on the manifesto of the political party [2,
p. 18], it brings a psychological benefit to the party that achieved the highest number of second votes within
the last election and therefore comes up on the top of the race [14, §30, Rn. 8]. This effect would be lost by
using the random order of Preˆt a` Voter. Therefore, non-established parties would win the benefit to be on
top of the list periodically. Consequently, the key idea of Preˆt a` Voter brings a big advantage over the known
paper ballot system. New parties could obtain the benefit of getting registered first by the voters just like
the catch-all parties. Through this the constitutional requirement of the equal suffrage would be invigorated.
Furthermore, a strict order of the candidates is not compulsory according to the election principles of Article
38.1 GG.
5 Analysis of design proposals — ballot paper
In this section, we discuss different aspects of the ballot layout including which of the possible types of
randomization for candidates and parties is most appropriate, how to design the ballot paper to easily
remove the part that is scanned, how to integrate the hash value of the encrypted order of candidates, and
how to enable invalid votes.
5.1 Type of random order
According to [11], two different types of randomisation can be applied, namely completely arbitrary order
or cyclic shifting of candidate order. Chaum et al. point out in [7] that the distance between marks on the
receipt can leak some information if entries are only shifted and the voter is allowed to mark more than one
entry. This is not the case for arbitrary order of entries as the successor and predecessor of every entry differs
from ballot paper to ballot paper. The current ballot paper for the German federal election contains two
races on one paper in two columns (compare to Fig. 1) which leads to a similar problem then mentioned in
[7]. For instances, two entries in a row leak the information that the voter cast a vote for a direct candidate
and the associated party which would violate the principle of the secret suffrage according to Article 38.1
GG. This principle includes that it needs to remain secret whether voters split their votes or cast them based
on a single preferred party [14, §1, Rn. 95].
Cyclic shifting has, compared to an arbitrary order, the advantage that it is easier for the voter to find
their candidate and party since the sequence of the candidates stays the same on all ballot papers. Therefore,
the most appropriate way to randomize the order seems to be the use of cyclic shifting while each race is
shifted with its own value. Note, in case where one race has more entries (candidates or parties), the empty
columns are not included in the shifting algorithm (compare to Fig. 3). This approach leads to two different
shift values which can either be encrypted together to one ciphertext and then hashed or the hash of two
separate ciphertexts is computed.
8 Every person, eligible to vote, has the same number of votes and is able to vote in the same way.
9 All votes have the same influence on the election result.
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5.2 General ballot layout
Using Preˆt a` Voter it is necessary that the voters can easily detach their markings and destroy the parts
with the candidates on. On the current ballot paper for federal elections the candidate list and party list
respectively shows up on the left and right hand side and voters mark their decision for both races in the
centre of the ballot paper. As approaches like using two different ballot papers, putting the second race below
the first race, and swapping the two races are either not practical or do not comply with §30.2 FEA and
§45.1 FEC including appendix 26 of FEC respectively, we recommend to keep the ballot paper format from
the traditional system but prepare it in a way that it is easy to detach the candidate lists on the left and
right hand side. This remaining central part of the ballot paper, containing the marked positions and the
hash value is scanned.
5.3 Obscuring hash values on ballots
Although voters are not committed to keep their voting decision secret, they are not allowed to get a receipt
of it which can be used as an evidence of the respective vote. Due to the possibility that voters might take
a picture of themselves including the marked but not detached ballot paper and the respective hash value
which will be published on the BB later, the secrecy of the vote and indirectly also the free suffrage of the
election (compare to [14, §1, Rn. 94]) could be violated. The picture together with the corresponding entry
on the BB serves as a proof to sell votes. By entering the code on the BB, a potential extortionist could
control if voters really cast their vote, which position they marked and correspondingly (by using the picture)
for which candidate. Note, also in the traditional system one could take a similar picture but this picture
does not serve as proof as the voter might have asked for a new ballot paper afterwards. Correspondingly,
the hash value may not be plain as long as it is possible to link it to the particular ballot form and the order
of entries on it. This is an issue during the vote casting process.
To solve this problem, the hash value could be hidden by various measures e.g. a scratch strip or invisible
ink. Organisational procedures need to ensure that voters first detach the centre part of the ballot, destroy
the remaining parts in the polling booth and then reveal the covered hash value outside of the polling booth
before scanning it. While this is required from the legal perspective more research on this approach is required
including whether voters would feel comfortable with the strict process needed in this case and technical
challenges.
5.4 Enabling invalid votes
Due to privacy issues Preˆt a` Voter neither accepts under- and over-votes nor empty votes. In the traditional
system any of these possibilities can be used to cast an invalid vote. Also paintings or writings on the ballot
paper would result in an invalid vote. If a corresponding vote is scanned by Preˆt a` Voter the system will
inform the voter and reject this vote.
§39 FEA defines the term of invalid votes and ascertains the way to deal with them. According to [14, §1,
Rn. 23], the principle of the free suffrage contains the right to cast invalid votes. Otherwise people eligible
to vote could be forced to cast a vote for a candidate. In reference to this, voters are allowed to vote the
candidate they like, vote invalid while participating in the election, and to abstain from voting as well. In
Preˆt a` Voter this aspect can be addressed by adding one field to the candidate/party list of every race with
the option to cast an invalid vote (as proposed in [15]).10
From a legal perspective, it needs to be discussed whether voters can be forced to vote invalid in a certain
way by marking the respective field. This might violate the principle of the free suffrage. But electronic voting
is discussed in order to reduce the number of invalid votes cast by accident. The voting system of Preˆt a`
Voter is able to support this intention.
All the different aspects of the ballot designed have been combined in an example ballot shown in Fig. 3.
10 Note, in order to spoil the whole ballot paper it is required to mark both invalid vote entries.
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Fig. 3. Proposed ballot paper
6 Analysis of design proposals — processes
In this section, we discuss the relevant processes including ballot printing, vote casting, scanning, and the
publishing of the receipts on BB.
6.1 Ballot printing process
There are two possibilities to consider for the timing of printing the ballot forms. It can be carried out either
on demand in the polling station, or in advance of Election Day. The advantage of printing on demand is
that there are no chain of custody issues with respect to the physical ballot forms, since they do not exist
in physical form before they are printed for immediate use. However, printing on demand has a number
of disadvantages: printers are needed in each polling station and additional effort at local level is required.
The inclusion of measures such as scratch strips or invisible ink to mask the hash value will require special
equipment. Hence, printing on demand is not appropriate. We therefore recommend that printing of the
ballot forms is carried out in advance of the election.
We further recommend that the Election Manager takes responsibility for the printing at the same physical
location as the generation of the ballot forms, where they are printed directly as they are generated, so that
no electronic file of the ballot forms needs to be created. The ballot form generation system (servers and
printers) should also be isolated from any network. A high level of trust is required in the printing provider,
since it knows the association of ballot orders and the hash values. This can be mitigated by involving
several parties in the printing process and using mechanisms to distribute the information between them, as
discussed in [12], though this can become cumbersome.
Once generated, the chain of custody of the ballot forms through to their use in the election must be
securely managed, to ensure that the information they contain remains secret, and that ballot forms cannot
be added or removed.
6.2 Vote casting process
The detached centre part of the ballot form could either be scanned inside or outside of the polling booth. In
case of the first variant, voters would have to scan the respective part on their own and without any external
help. Irrespective of the question if they might be able and willing to do so, the returning committee could
not confirm that the hash value is not revealed until the scanning process starts. This is no option due to
the possibility of violating the principle of the secret suffrage (see Section 5.3).
In the second case, voters would have to scan the detached centre part of the ballot paper after having
revealed the hash value outside the polling booth in front of the returning committee. Because voters might
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appreciate the help given by the returning committee, this approach would probably be the more pleasant
one from a practical point of view. According to [14, §1, Rn. 95] nobody shall know if voters cast an over,
under or empty vote if they do not disclose their voting decision by themselves. It should be noted that the
system reveals some information by rejecting the scanned paper.
However, this situation could be improved for voters by providing a separate scanner in the polling booth.
Voters could run a test scan before casting their votes outside in order to check whether the system accepts
their ballot and whether they agree with the interpretation of the scan. While changing the rules for casting a
vote change (in particular for casting an invalid one), we expect people to feel more comfortable pre-scanning
their ballot in the voting booth.
Voters could still try to scan an invalid vote in public, disclaim the possibility of checking their filled
ballot paper in advance, add marks after they checked the ballot paper or just ignore the feedback. But this
situation might be comparable to the one regulated in §56.6 and 8 FEC. After this the returning committee
has to rebuff every voter who tries to put an unfolded ballot paper into the ballot box. In case the voter
still wants to cast a vote, the returning committee hands out a new ballot form after destroying the old one.
Herewith the legislator wanted to assure voters do not waive their right of secret voting. However, further
research from a legal point of view is required to back up this comparison.
6.3 Vote scanning process
Once the strip with the marks is scanned, there exist several possibilities to interpret the marks as votes.
For instance one can detect crossing lines or the degree of blackening in the bubbles. The interpretation
algorithm must comply with the legal guidelines.
After §34.2 of the FEA voters cast their votes by marking the particular section of the candidate on
the ballot form with a cross or any other sign which indicates the voting decision. Consequently voters are
free to choose any mark they like as long as it is not unconstitutional. The secret suffrage for example is
violated by using a very individual sign like signatures, which could be attributed to a particular voter. A
sign outside of the field is not forbidden if an allocation to a certain candidate is possible [14, §34, Rn. 4].
But according to §39 FEA the votes cast are invalid in certain cases, e.g. when the voter hands in a ballot
paper with an addition or a caveat on it. Although both terms are not defined in the FEA, the returning
committee needs to decide about the validity of every vote. Therefore decisions can be made differently in
different constituencies. After [14, §39, Rn. 12] for example an addition is every verbal annexation on the
ballot paper which outruns the allowed annexation according to §34.2 FEA. Admittedly non-verbal terms
need to be covered as well, e. g. a skull and crossbones on the ballot paper.
The scanner used by Preˆt a` Voter needs to be programmed in order to convert the given information while
taking these uncertainties into account. Note, as voters still cast their vote on ballot papers it is possible that
they could add marks or pictures which make the vote invalid but would be accepted by the system. The
system’s interpretation of the scan will naturally depend on the thresholds used, for example the degree of
blackening accepted as a mark, in the image processing algorithms applied to the scan, and this may differ
from the voter’s expectation. Therefore the voting system of Preˆt a` Voter provides a confirmation stage for
the voter. This option would show voters how their vote is interpreted, and provide the option to fill in
another ballot paper if required. The confirmation stage would solve another problem as well: if voters put
a comment into the section for a candidate — even the comment shows the antipathies of the voter — the
system would count this as a valid vote for the respective candidate. This can only be acceptable when the
voter confirms the interpretation of the system. On the condition of this confirmation stage, it might be
legally compatible that the scanning process ignores additional marks or pictures and accepts ballot papers
where exactly one mark per race is detected. Further this solution provides a consistent processing of votes.
6.4 Process of publishing receipts
The scanner prints out a signed receipt for each voter to take home. In order to enable voters to verify
that their encrypted votes are recorded correctly, the corresponding electronic version of these receipts are
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published on the BB. These receipts could be published right after casting the vote or after the official end
of the election. If they are published during the Election Day, an internet connection in the polling station
would be needed. Irrespective of the increasingly higher costs, the risk of manipulation over the internet
would come up as well. Therefore, we recommend to take the equipment first to some central places in the
election district, count and tally votes, get backups of everything and then publish the receipts containing
the position of the marks and the hash value together with the corresponding ciphertext.
The publishing of receipts after the closing of the polling station is also compatible with the current
regulations of the FEC. According to §§54, 67 FEC voters can watch the counting of votes in traditional
paper based elections only after the closing of the election. In addition, by publishing afterwards, voters
would not lose the possibility to appeal against the election or certain election decisions. According to
Article 41 GG complaints requesting the scrutiny of an election need to be discussed and adjudicated by the
Bundestag. After §2.4 of the Law on the Scrutiny of Elections the complaints have to be submitted within two
months after the elections. After the jurisdiction of the Federal Constitutional Court the unobstructed run
of parliamentary elections requires that legal control during the election is reserved for complaints requesting
the scrutiny of the election afterwards [3].
7 Analysis of design proposals — verifiability
After the verdict of the Federal Constitutional Court from the 3rd March of 2009 the voter himself or herself
must be able to verify whether his or her vote as cast is properly recorded as a basis for counting [5, page 72].
It is not sufficient if voters must rely on the functionality of the system without the possibility of personal
inspection [5, page 72]. Electronic voting systems need to provide a possibility for the voter to check the
essential steps in the election act and in the ascertainment of the results to the same amount as in traditional
paper based elections. Here voters are able to watch the entire election procedure — from the opening of
the polling station until the vote counting and tallying. Thus, even though only very few people take the
opportunity to observe the whole process it is in general possible.
In this section we consider the verifiability aspects of the stages of processing the votes while we distinguish
between individual and public verifiability and discuss their compliance with the demands from the court
decision.
7.1 Individual verifiability
Individual verifiability covers well-formedness (to ensure that votes are cast as intended) and the fact that
the voter can verify that their hash value appears on the BB (to ensure that votes are stored as cast). Well-
formedness of the ballot forms requires that the printed candidate list matches the list embedded in the hash
value. Ballot forms can be checked by requesting a decryption of the ciphertext belonging to the hash value
from the election decryption servers. There will be some random well-formedness checks by independent
auditors ahead of and during the election. Due to the legal requirement this event will be announced and
will be accessible by the public11.
Also during the election, voters themselves may request to audit ballot forms that they are given. When
given a ballot form, a voter can choose whether to select it for audit, or to use it to cast a vote. In the case
of audit, the voter retains an audit copy of the entire ballot form with the visible hash value, and the system
retains and logs that ballot form as selected for audit by entering the hash value in a separate interface.
This is necessary to prevent the form also being used to vote, since secrecy will be lost. In the post election
phase, the audit process will be completed, by decrypting and publishing the list of candidates, for the voter
to verify.
If a vote is cast, the voter is provided with a receipt of the right hand side, and after the election when
the receipts are published, the voter can use this to verify that the information contained on it has been
included on the published list of cast votes, which will next become mixed and decrypted.
11 In addition, to enabling them to observe even they cannot be physically present, a live stream could be broadcasted.
9
If voters detect a problem with either of these two lists, then the voter’s receipt and the entire ballot
form respectively are evidence that can be used as a basis for a challenge to the election. It is important
that receipts and the entire ballot form for auditing cannot easily be forged, since that would enable voters
to mount fake challenges.
7.2 Public verifiability
The cast votes are submitted in encrypted form. The next stage of the process is to pass them through
several rounds of a re-encryption mix, where each round re-encrypts and shuﬄes all of the votes. The output
of that process is another list of encrypted votes, which can then be decrypted and tallied.
Re-encryption mixes allow several approaches to verification, as described earlier. The legal requirement
that it must be possible to check the essential steps in the election process inclines us towards the randomised
partial checking approach, rather than using proofs of re-encryption: the mechanism of random sampling and
checking is more intuitive and comprehensible to the public, and in principle any observer can contribute
to the random audit checks. Each stage of the mix, i.e. each intermediate list of encrypted votes, is made
public. A check involves challenging a particular re-encryption link in the mix and obtaining evidence of the
re-encryption (i.e. the randomisation introduced in that step) that can be independently checked. In a mix,
half of the links will be randomly checked, but in a way that ensures that no receipt can be traced through
the mix. More precisely, the audits, while essentially random, can be carefully constrained to ensure that
there are numerous breaks in the chain from receipt to decrypted vote.
Several re-encryption mixes can be run, in parallel or at any later time on request, which on decryption
of the output should all yield the same result. The confidence level can be made as high as required by
adding parallel mixes and audits. For a winning margin of n votes, the probability that a different candidate
was in fact the winner but no altered votes were found by the audit, will be at most 2−n/2, which decreases
exponentially as n increases: for example, a winning margin of only 40 votes is 99.9999% certain to be correct
if the randomised partial checking audit on a single re-encryption net is successful, i.e. does not find any
incorrect re-encryptions. If a higher level of certainty is required, then further mixnets can be generated and
audited.
The remaining steps of the process are all publicly verifiable: the decryption of the outputs from the mix
along with proofs of correctness of the decryptions is published, and can be verified by anyone. The tallying
of the decrypted votes is also published and can also be checked independently.
With this proposed verifiability of the election, the level of verifiability can be increase compared to the
level of verifiability in traditional paper based election systems. However, what remains for future work is to
deduce an acceptable certainty for both individual and public verifiability from both legal requirements and
the accepted error rate in traditional paper based elections.
8 Analysis of design proposals — election management
The election can be run centrally, or it can be distributed. The advantage of running the election from a
single central location is that the system needs to be set up only once, and one single election system is likely
to reduce costs in terms of equipment and management in comparison to a number of smaller ones. However,
the disadvantage is that a single system will be a bottleneck, both in terms of setting up the election in
the first place, including the generation and printing of the ballot forms, and in terms of the length of time
needed to process the large number of cast ballots.
Alternatively the election may be decentralised, and run across a number of locations. This can be
achieved by setting up completely independent Preˆt a` Voter systems, each to run the election for a number
of constituencies, and collating their results. This has the advantage of processing the cast votes in parallel,
obtaining the result more quickly than a single central system would be able to. Another advantage of
decentralisation is that challenges can be handled more efficiently at a more local level.
The election naturally separates into smaller races which can be run and processed separately: The ballot
forms differ for every electoral district, so the preparation before the election is different for each district
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and can be distributed. Furthermore, the results of each electoral district must in any case be reported
separately, meaning that the votes from each electoral district must be processed and tallied separately. The
Preˆt a` Voter system is able to manage this by processing the votes in batches and reporting separately on
the results, one district at a time, and this task distributes naturally across a number of such systems.
Our recommendation is therefore to decentralise the election management. The optimal level of decen-
tralisation balances the overall resources required against the gains achieved in terms of efficient management
of the election and speed of reporting the result, and in this context we would recommend decentralisation
to the level of federal states.
9 Conclusion and future work
The paper analyses Preˆt a` Voter regarding its readiness for German federal elections and discusses different
design proposals in order to decide which of the many different variations of Preˆt a` Voter fits best. While
already a lot of different aspects from the legal perspective are covered and ensured by the proposed version,
some others need to be discussed in future work. The main one is the requirement of [5, page 39] that all
essential steps in an election are subject to public examinability (unless other constitutional interests justify
an exception). This needs to be possible without any special expert knowledge [5, page 39]. Against this
background, it needs to be discussed whether and how a system like Preˆt a` Voter can fulfil this requirement.
Therefore, it is first necessary to further analyse the judgement regarding the question whether voters need
to be able to check the election manually or whether tool support is acceptable as well as understanding
the general idea, or whether it is necessary to follow all mathematical steps (which would obviously not be
possible for a system like Preˆt a` Voter). Besides this, future work includes discussions about data storage
(which data for how long) and responsibilities (who prints and keeps the ballot papers, how many key holders,
election servers, and mix nodes as well as who they are). Although the receipt gives no information about the
particular voter, long term secrecy needs to be broached as well. Furthermore, an acceptable certainty for
both individual and public verifiability needs to be deduced from legal requirements and the accepted error
rate in traditional paper based elections. Besides that we have to view the fact that visually handicapped
people cannot cast their votes by using a plastic template (with Braille on it to put the ballot paper in)
anymore when introducing Preˆt a` Voter. Therefore, it needs to be discussed whether a particular amount of
ballot papers with Braille needs to be available in each polling station.
In addition to these legal aspects, there are also usability and acceptance issues, for instance regarding
whether detaching is feasible without destroying the centre part of the ballot paper and destroying the other
parts, as well as accepting that only test ballots can be audited but not the one to cast and the strict
processes demanded in the polling station.
Another challenge is extending a suggestion regarding the vote scanning process and enabling voters to
check the signature on their receipt, to ensure their receipt is genuine evidence of their cast ballot. This
requires additional equipment, perhaps provided by independent organisations. If this is not feasible then it
may be appropriate to use conventional anti-counterfeiting measures, such as special paper for the receipts,
special patterns, rubber stamping, and so on. This challenge is the subject of current research.
This paper shows that it is worth analysing systems with an interdisciplinary team to ensure that they
are not only secure from a cryptographic point of view but also conform to elections laws for particular
elections.
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